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In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1967.

No. 67.
JOHN W. TERRY, et al.,

Petitioners,
vs.
STATE OF

omo,

Respondent.
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
In Opposition to a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
To the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County, Ohio.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.
Every state legislative· enactment dealing with the
regulation of human conduct is a potential cause of inconvenience and petty indignity. This is the price we
pay for being free men and for being able to live in an
orderly, civilized democratic society. That price is
measured in terms of the restrictions of human conduct as
enunciated by the laws of the Land and the states.
Many Amici have passed before the Court in argument of this matter. Their arguments contain civil rights
inferences, and problems related thereto, mixed marriages
and the complications they present. The gist of their arguments is that the right of personal security, the personal
liberties and the private properties of free men will be
forfeited if the case at bar is affirmed.
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The problem presented has no immediate relation to
any of these arguments. Nor will any of the constitutional
safeguards pertaining to individual liberty be forfeited by
an affirmance of the appellate court's decision.
The formulation of standards of criminal due process
consistent with the imperatives of individual liberty in an
orderly civilized society is as much the concern of the State
and its citizens as a whole as it is of these petitioners, the
American Civil Liberties Union, and the other interested
Amici.
With this thought the respondent is interested in
guideposts in this virtually endless series of vexing legal
questions as to the rights of the individual and the right
of our civilized, .orderly democratic society t() continue
to take necessary steps (in the formulating of rules and
laws) for the preservation of its existence.
What the instant case does involve is the right of a
police officer (society's agent) to make an on-the-street
stop, interrogate and pat do'wn for weapons (known in
street vernacular as "stop and frisk.")
This vexing legal question presents its difficulty not
in how far the Court should travel along the road but in
deciding what road should be taken.
It is in the expectation that the Court, in performing
its delicate task in the instant case, will balance the
equities of the individual petitioners in protecting their
right to privacy against the equities of our civilized, orderly democratic society and its need for workable rules to
use in the repression of ever-increasing crime, that respondent urges affirmance.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
John W. Terry and Richard D. Chilton (the latter now
deceased), the petitioners, were indicted on a charge
of carrying concealed weapons, in violation of Section
2923.01 of the Revised Code of Ohio. The trial court overruled a pretrial motion to suppress evidence (guns) and,
upon a plea of not guilty, the court, sitting without a jury,
returned a verdict of guilty as to both Terry and Chilton.
The relevant facts are as follows: At approximately
2:30 p.m. on October 31, 1963, a Cleveland detective with
39 years and 4 months' police experience observed two
men, later identified as John W. Terry and Richard D.
Chilton, on the corner of East 14th Street, Huron Road and
Euclid Avenue (in downtown Cleveland), engaging in behavior that immediately attracted his attention and
aroused his suspicions. Positioning himself across the
street he observed these men for approximately ten to
twelve minutes. One man remained at the comer, the
other walked several hundred feet up the street, peered
into the window of either a diamond store or an airline
office and then returned to the corner to converse with the
other. The other man in turn would leave the corner,
repeat the same pattern of conduct and return to the corner. This behavior pattern was repeated at least two to
five times by each man. During this period, a third man,
later identified as Carl Katz, approached the corner, spoke
briefly with the two men, departed and stationed himself
across the street. The two men resumed their pattern of
conduct, each making four to six more trips. The two men
then walked west on Euclid Avenue to 1120 Euclid Avenue where they encountered the third man who had
spoken with them previously and who was positioned
there. The detective testified: "* * * I didn't like their
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actions on Huron Road, and I suspected them of casing a
job, a stick-up * * *" (R. 42).
With this belief in mind, the detective approached the
three men, who then were engaged in conversation, identified himself as a police officer, and asked for their names.
Receiving only a mumbled, incoherent response (R. 2627-28), the officer took hold of one (later identified as
Terry), and turned him around in front of the officer facing the other two. He then patted Terry, the man in front
of him. At no time did his hands reach into any pockets
(R. 29-30) . In patting Terry the officer felt the butt of a
gun in the upper left pocket of the topcoat (R. 29). He
inserted his hand under the coat and felt the handle of a
gun. At this point the detective ordered the three men
from the street to the interior of a nearby store. Retaining
Terry by the collar of his coat he ordered all three to face
the wall and place the palms of their hands against the
wall. The detective then pulled Terry's coat by the collar,
from the rear, removing th~ coat from Terry's shoulders.
Exposed in the upper left inside coat pocket was a concealed revolver. The detective removed this gun (R. 185).
Subsequent examination proved it to be loaded. The officer proceeded to pat down the second man, Chilton, on
the outside of his clothing. He then felt an object in the
left overcoat pocket which felt like a gun. He inserted
his hand and removed a fully loaded revolver. A similar
"patting down" of Katz revealed nothing. The three men
were then taken to the police station where Terry and
Chilton were charged with carrying concealed weapons.
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ARGUMENT.

The instant case presents for review an example of
the principle enunciated by this Court in Ker v . California.,
374 U. S. 23, 34 (1963):
"The states are not thereby precluded from developing workable rules governing arrest, searches
and seizures to meet 'the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement' in
the states, provided that those rules do not violate the
constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches
and seizures and the concomitant command that evidence so seized is inadmissible against one who has
standing to complain. See Jones v. U. S., 362 U. S.
257 (1960).
"Such a standard implies no derogation of uniformity in applying federal constitutional guarantees
but is only recognition that conditions and circumstances vary just as do investigative and enforcement
techniques."
The questions presented in the brief of the petitioners
assume facts and conclusions which the record does not
support. The respondent urges that this case presents the
following propositions:
1. A police officer has the right to stop a person
engaged in suspicious behavior, in the absence of
probable cause for arrest, for the purpose of interrogation. Such action is not violative of the Constitution
of the United States.
2. Having stopped such person, based on observation of unusual behavior but without adequate
grounds for arrest, the officer has the right to "frisk"
for weapons for the protection of his own safety. Such
conduct is a standard set by the State of Ohio. It is
not violative of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
893
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3. "Stop and frisk" is differentiated from search
and seizure in that the quantum of facts required to
establish probable cause to "stop and frisk" is less
than the quantum of facts required to establish
probable cause to arrest and search.
4. In the case at bar the lawful "frisk" produced
additional evidentiary facts which gave rise to probable cause to arrest petitioners for committing a
felony in the presence of the officer.
5. In the case at bar there was a lawful arrest
without a warrant for the commission of a felony and
a legal search incident to the arrest; therefore evidence obtained in such search was admissible at the
trial.

These contentions will be considered in sequence.
I. In the stated circumstances a police officer may stop
and interrogate a person.
The Court of Appeals in its opinion affirming the conviction in the case at bar has adequately framed the first
question. (State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N. E.
2d 114.)
"The ambiguous nature of the word 'arrest,' and
the issue of the right of the police to stop a person in
a public street and question him under circumstances
that would reasonably call for investigation and inquiry * * * consequently, the initial question to be
resolved is the authority of the detective in the circumstances shown here, to stop and question the defendant. The validity of the subsequent police action
and the determination of whether the detective had
adequate grounds to make the arrest will hinge, in
part, on the propriety of the initial inquiry."
394
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"The right of the proper authorities to stop and
question persons in suspicious circumstances has its
roots in early English practice where it was approved
by the courts and the common-law commentators.
See: 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown (6th Ed. 1777)
122, 129; 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown (Amer. Ed.
1847) 89, 96-97; Lawrence v. Hedger (Common Pleas
1810) 3 Taunt. 14, 128 Eng. Rep. 6. Today, in several
states, the authority of police officers to detain suspects
for a reasonable time for questioning is granted by
statute. E.g., New York Code of Criminal Procedure
(L. 1964, Chapter 86, Section 180-a); General Laws
of Rhode Island (1956), Section 12-7-1; New Hampshire Revised Statutes (1955), Chapter 594, Section
2; 11 Delaware Code (1953), Section 1902; Warner,
"The Uniform Arrest Act," 28 Virginia Law Review
(1942) 315; Massachusetts General Laws (1961),
Chapter 41, Section 98. In others, the right is recognized by court decisions. E.g., People v. Rivera
(1964), 14 N. Y. 2d 441, 252 N. Y. S. 2d 458, 201
N. E. 2d 32; Gisske v. S_a nders (1908), 9 Cal. App.
13, 98 P . 43; People v. Martin (1956), 46 Cal. 2d 106,
293 P. 2d 52; People v. Jones (1959), 176 Cal. App. 2d
265, 1 Cal. R. 210; and People v. Faginkrantz (1961),
21 Ill. 2d 75, 171 N. E. 2d 5."
In Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963), the Court
has stated that the states are not precluded from developing workable rules governing arrest, searches and seizures,
to meet "the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement," provided that those
rules do not violate the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the concomitant
command that the evidence so seized is inadmissible
against one who has standing to complain.
The development of workable rules governing arrest,
searches and seizures and stopping a person in a public
street and questioning him under circumstances that
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would reasonably call for investigation and inquiry is a
legitimate exercise of the police power 1 of the State and
does not contravene any constitutional provisions.2
Police power is not brought into existence by the
constitution or by the legislature.8 It is a power inherent
in the existence of government.4 It is the power of self
protection and has its origin, purpose and scope in the
general welfare, or as maintained here, the public safety.6
The police power is asserted to protect the well-being of
society and maintain the security of the social order.6 It is
invoked by the courts to sustain rules and regulations
passed to provide for the public safety or welfare 7 and
which do not contravene any constitutional provisions.8
The object of the exercise of the police power is the promotion of the public good. 10 0. J . 2nd, Constitutional
Law, Section 325, page 403.
The police power is the right of self preservation and
self protection on the part of the community and its
State v. Dilley, 49 N. J. 460 (1967), 231 A. 2d 353, 357.
Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com., 326
Ill. 625, 158 N. E. 376, 55 A. L. R. 654.
3 Franklin County v. Public Utilities Com., 107 Ohio St. 442,
140 N. E. 87, 30 A. L. R. 429; Colletti v . State, 12 Ohio App. 104,
31 Ohio C. A. 81, err overr 17 Ohio L._ Rep. 364, 64 W. L. Bull.
462.
The police power of the state is not derived from the constitution of the United States, but is a power existing in them as
sovereign states. Armour & Company v. Augusta, 134 Ga. 178,
67 S. E. 417.
4 N ebbia v. New York, 291 U. S . 502, 78 L. ed. 940, 54 S. Ct.
505, 89 A. L. R. 1469; Lakeshore & M. S. R. Co. v. Smith, 173
U. S. 684, 43 L. ed. 858, 19 S. Ct. 565.
s Re Rameriz, 193 Cal. 633, 226 P. 914, 34 A. L. R. 51; VermO'nt Salvage Corp. v . St. Johnsbury, 113 Vt. 341, 34 A. 2d 188.
G State v . Powell, 58 Ohio St. 324, 50 N. E. 900; Sweet v.
Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 40 L. ed. 188, 16 S. Ct. 43.
1 Meadowcro~ v. People, 163 ill. 56, 45 N. E. 991; People v .
Dehn, 190 Mich. 122, 155 N. W. 744.
s See Note No. 2 supra.
1

2
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exercise is justified by the necessity of the occasion. State
v. Boone, 84 Ohio St. 346, 95 N. E. 924.
The measure of the police power is a measure of the
public need.9 It is described as the law of necessity 10 and
always one of the least !imitable 11 of the powers of government. It is that full final power that is involved in the
administration of law as a means to the administration of
practical justice.12
The term "police power" is not found in the Federal
constitution or in the Ohio constitution. 13 It is a judicial
invention. Because of its great dimensions and because it
alters to keep pace with the times, courts wisely have not
attempted to define it with exactness or precision. H Each
individual case must stand upon its own footing. To approach some definition of it in relation to the case before
State v. Henry, 37 N. M. 536, 25 P. 2d 204, 90 A. L. R. 805.
To be a legitimate exercise of the police power, a statute
9

must be reasonably necessary to promote the accomplishment of
a public good or to prevent the ihfliction of a public harm. Sta:te
v. Ball.a.nee, 229 N. C. 764, 51 S. E. 2d 731, 7 A. L. R. 2d 407.
10 Re Yu.n Quong, 159 Cal. 508, 114 P. 835; Randall v. Pa.tck,
118 Me. 303, 108 A. 97, 8 A. L . R. 65.
1 1 Qu.eenside HiLl.s Rea.lty Co. v. Sa.:rl, 328 U. S. 80, 90 L. ed.
1096, 66 S. Ct. 850.
12 Wessell v. Timberlake, 95 Ohio St. 21, 116 N. E. 43.
The police power is nothing more or less than the powers of
government inherent in every Sovereignty to the extent of its
dominions. A. F. L. v. American Sash & Door Co., 67 Ariz. 20,
189 P. 2d 912, Affd. 335 U. S. 538, 93 L. ed. 222, 69 S. Ct. 258, 6
A. L. R. 2d 481
13 See note No. 3 supra..
14 Colletti v. Sta.te, 12 Ohio App. 104.
An attempt to define the reach of the police power or to
trace its outer limits is fruitless; each case must turn on its own
facts. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 99 L. ed. 27, 75 S. Ct. 98.
Definitions of police power which give its boundaries with
precision have not been attempted by any courts. It is wise that
it is so, because this, like many of the subject matters of the law,
is constantly in the process of evolution and development, and
must be adapted to the social, industrial, and commercial conditions of the times. WesseU v. Timberlake, 95 Ohio St. 21, 116
N. E. 43.
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the bar we consider it as that inherent sovereignty which
it is the right and duty of the government or its agents
to exercise whenever public policy in a broad sense demands, for the benefit of society at large, regulations to
guard its safety, order, or to insure in any respect such
economic conditions as an advancing civilization of a
highly complex character requires. 115
Considering the increase in crime, and the boldness
of today's criminal and his use of every modern technical
device, modern society requires the exercise for the public
good of the right of officers to stop persons who are engaged in suspicious activity on the streets.
Certainly the police power is circumscribed by the
express limitation of the state and federal constitutions. 16
West Coast Hotel Co. v . Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 81 L . ed.
703, 57 S. Ct. 578, 108 A. L. R. 1330.
16 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, 96
L. ed. 469, 72 S. Ct. 407, reh. den. 343 U.S. 921, 96 L. ed. 1334, 72
S. Ct. 674. The various exercises by the states of their police
power stand on an equal footing, all being entitled to the same
presumption of validity when challenged under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and all being of equal
dignity when measured against the commerce clause. Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U. S. 520, 3 L. ed. 2d 1003, 79
S. Ct. 962.
The states have power to legislate against what are found to
be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business
affairs so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific
federal constitutional provision, or of some valid federal law.
Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
335 U. S. 525, 93 L. ed. 212, 69 S. Ct. 251, 6 A . L. R. 2d 473.
While the police power is very broad, it is bound by. constitutional limitations and cannot properly be exercised beyond
such reasonable interferences with the liberty of action of individuals as are really necessary to preserve and protect the
public health, safety, and welfare. Corneal v. State Plant Board
(Fla.), 95 So. 2d 1, 70 A. L. R. 2d 845.
The police power is an attribute of sovereignty and a function that cannot be surrendered. It exists without express declaration, and the only limitation upon it is that it must reasonably
tend to correct some evil or promote some interest of the state,
and not violate any direct or positive mandate of the constitution.
Shea v . Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P . 2d 615, 111 A. L. R. 998,
affd. on reh. 186 Wash. 700, 59 P. 2d 1183, 111 A. L. R. 1011.
15
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It does, however, include anything which is reasonable,
necessary and appropriate to secure the peace, order,
protection, safety, welfare, and best interests of the
public. 17

There can be no question that the constitutional requirement of due process of law is a limitation upon the
police power.18 It may be the only real specific limitation 19
and is certainly the most important for purposes of this
case if the limits of reasonableness are regarded as
founded on the requirement of due process.
A reasonable exercise of the police power does not
constitute a violation of due process.2 0 The guarantee of
due process in the exercise of police power demands only
that the law shall not be unreasonable, 21 arbitrary or
capricious,22 and that the means selected shall have a real
17

See note No. 5 supra.

Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 71 L. ed. 303,
47 S. Ct. 114, 54 A. L. R. 1016; State v. Crea.mer, 85 Ohio St. 349,
97 N. E. 602; Mirick v. Gims, 79 Ohio St. 174, 86 N. E. 880;
Colletti v. State, 12 0. App. 104.
The police power is not subject to any definite limitations,
but is coextensive with the necessities of the case and the safeguarding of the public interests. Steinberg-Baum & Co. v.
Countryman, 247 Iowa 923, 77 N. W. 2d 15.
18

Ba.ton Rouge v. Rebowe, 226 La. 186, 75 So. 2d 239.
The test of a police regulation when measured by the due
process clause of the constitution is reasonableness as distinguished from arbitrary or capricious action. State ex 'Tel DavisSmith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101.
The requirement of reasonableness is but a manifestation of
the due process requirement, see Hoff v. State, 39 Del 134, 197
A. 75.
20 See note No. 2 supra.
21 Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v . Wa.lteTs, 294 U. S. 405, 79
L. ed. 949, 55 S. Ct. 486; Re Steu.be, 91 Ohio St. 135, 110 N. E.
250.
22 People v. Griswold, 213 N. Y. 92, 106 N. E. 929.
19

399

12
and substantial relation to the object sought to be
attained.23
Due process of law does not forbid the sovereign to
legislate to affect a class by description 24 (persons reasonably suspected of having committed or about to commit a
crime) or to embrace the entire population,2G the only requirement being that there shall be some reasonable basis
and that the law shall operate equally.26
Government is based upon the proposition that certain
inherent natural rights of the individual must be surrendered for the common good of all. If this principle
were not applied, our government and our orderly society
could not exist. Accordingly, regulations or conduct engaged in by virtue of the police power generally are confined to limitations upon or abrogations of constitutionally
guaranteed rights. Most of the constitutional guarantees
are subject to the police power of the state and may be
regulated in the interest of the welfare and safety of the
people. The state and ~ederal constitutional provisions
protecting personal liberties do not prohibit such regulations. They merely condition the exercise of the admitted
power by securing that the end shall be accomplished by
methods consistent with due process. Personal rights must
yield in the public interest to the valid exercise of the
police power of the state. Liberty does not import an
absolute right to be at all times and in all circumstances
23 Sandstrom v. California. Horse Racing Board, 31 Cal. 2d
401, 189 P. 2d 17, 3 A. L. R. 2d 90, Cert. den. 335 U. S. 814, 93
L. ed. 369, 69 S. Ct. 31.
2 4 State ex rel. Schneider v . Gullatt Cleaning and Laundry,
32 0. N. P. N. S. 121.
2:; Aetna F. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 78 S. C. 445, 59 S. E. 148.
2G Standard OiL Co. v. Marysville, 279 U. S. 582, 73 L. ed.
856, 49 S. Ct. 430; Davis· v. State, 26 Ohio App. 340, 159 N. E.
575, affd. 118 Ohio St. 25, 160 N. E. 473, error dismd. 277 U. S.
571, 72 L. ed. 993, 48 S. Ct. 432.
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wholly freed from restraint. There are many restraints to
which every person is necessarily subject for the common
good.21 This Court has held that a reasonable abridgement
of the constitutional guarantees will be sustained under
the police power.28
This Court, however, has never squarely decided
whether the police may constitutionally stop and question
a suspect without his consent in the absence of adequate
grounds for arrest. However, the lower federal courts
permit such field interrogations. See, Henry v. United
States, 361 U. S. 98, 106 (1959) (Clark, J. dissenting);
Brinegar v. U. S., 338 U. S. 160, 178 (1949) (Burton, J.
concurring); Keiningha.m v. United States, 307 F. (2d)
632 (D. C. Cir. 1962), cert. den. 371 U. S. 948 (1963);
Busby v. United States, 296 F. (2d) 328 (9th Cir. 1961),
cert. den. 369 U. S. 876 (1962). The cases also indicate
that an officer may stop and question even though he has
insufficient grounds to make an arrest. See Ellis vs. United
States, 264 F. (2d) 372 (D. C. Cir.), cert. den. 359 U. S.
998 (1959); United States vs. Bonnano, 180 F. Supp. 71,
78 (S. D. N. Y. 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.,
U. S. vs. Buffa.lino, 285 F. (2d) 408 (2d Cir. 1960), cited
with approval in U. S. vs. Vita, 294 F. (2d) 524, 530
(2d Cir. l961).
As stated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals:
"Admittedly there is some division of authority on
the legality of the right to stop and question; however,
the better view seems to be that the stopping and
questioning of suspicious persons is not prohibited by
the constitution. See, Note, 50 Cornell L. Q. 529, 533
(1965); United States vs. Vita, 294 F. (2d) 524 (2d
27

Benjamin v. Colu.mbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N. E. 2d 854,
Cert. den. 357 U.S. 904, 2 L. ed. 2d 1155, 78 S. Ct. 1147.
28 See 16 Am. Ju.sp. 2d Const. L. Sec. 287, 307, P. 556, 602.
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Cir. 1961), cert. den. 369 U. S. 823 (1962). Of great
persuasive authority do we consider the long line of
California cases, decided under the rule of People vs.
Cahan, 44 Cal. (2d) 434 (1955), 282 P. 2d 905, in
which this practice has been upheld. E.g., People vs.
Martin, 46 Cal. (2d) 106 (1956), 293 P. 2d 52; People
vs. Simon, 45 Cal. (2d) 645 (1955), 290 P. 2d 531;
People vs. Jones, 176 Cal. App. (2d) 265 (1959), 1
Cal. Rep. 210. Also of great persuasive authority is
the recent New York Court of Appeals decision in
People vs. Rivera, 14 N. Y. (2d) 441 (1964), 201 N. E.
2d 32, wherein this practice was also upheld. The
courts of Ohio do not appear to have been squarely
presented with this problem before. Therefore, we
hold, in line with the great weight of authority, that a
policeman may, under appropriate circumstances such
as exist in this case, reasonably inquire of a person
concerning his suspicious on-the-street behavior in
the absence of reasonable grounds to arrest.
"An individual who acts in a suspicious manner
invites a preliminary inquiry by the proper authority.
It does not unreasonably invade the individual's right
to privacy to hold that the price of indulgence in
suspicious behavior is a police inquiry. See, Traynor,
'Mapp vs. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States,' 1962
Duke Law Journal 319 (1962). Such a minor inter£erence with personal liberty would 'touch the right
of privacy only to serve it well.' Traynor, supra at
p. 334. If such questioning failed to reveal probable
cause, it would thereby forestall invalid arrests of
innocent persons on inadequate cause and the attendant invasion of personal liberty and reputation. If it
revealed probable cause, it would do no more than
open the way to a valid arrest. The business of the
police is not only to solve crimes after they occur, but
to prevent them from taking place whenever it is
legally possible. As stated by the New York Court of
Appeals in the recent case of People vs. Rivera
(1964), 14 N. Y. 2d 441, at p. 444, 201 N. E. 2d 32:
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'The authority of the police to stop\ <lefendant and
question him in the circumstances is perfectly clear.
* * * Prompt inquiry into suspicious or unusual
street action is an indispensable police power in the
orderly government of large urban communities.
It is a prime function of the city police to be alert
to things going wrong in the streets; if they were
denied the right to such summary inquiry, a normal
power and a necessary duty would be closed off.'
"Admittedly, this power to inquire may be abused.
But the possibility of some future infraction should
not require that the police should now be made powerless to make reasonable inquiries into suspicious
behavior. If such abuses arise, we shall deal with
them when the time comes. However, for the present,
we hold that under the facts of this case, the detective's inquiry was reasonable under the conditions
presented."
It is well settled that there is nothing ipso facto unconstitutional in the brief detention of citizens under circumstances not justifying an arrest, for the purpose of
limited inquiry in the course of routine police investigation. Rios v. U. S., 364 U. S. 253, 80 S. Ct. 1431, 4 L. ed.
2d 1688 (1960); Busby vs. U. S., 296 Fed. (2d) 328 (9th
Cir. 1961).
The local policeman, in addition to having a duty to
enforce the criminal laws of his jurisdiction, is also in a
very real sense a guardian of the public peace and he has
a duty in the course of his work to be alert for suspicious,
circumstances, and provided that he acts within constitutional limits, to investigate whenever such circumstances indicate to him that he should do so. Frye vs.
U. S. , 315 Fed. 2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1963) .
Due regard for the practical necessities of effective
law enforcement requires that the validity of brief informal detention be recognized whenever it appears from
403
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the totality of the circumstances that the detaining officers
could have had reasonable grounds for their action. A
founded suspicion is all that is necessary, some basis
from which the courts can determine that detention was
not arbitrary or harassing. Wilson vs. Porter, 361 Fed. 2d
412, 415 (9th Cir. 1966).
Reasonable investigatory techniques may be pursued
by police indoors as well as outdoors and it is not unusual
for officers to seek interviews with suspects or witnesses
or to call upon them at their homes for such purposes.
People vs. Machel, 4.4 Cal. Rpts. 126. Generally, police
officers may detain and question persons when the circumstances are such as would indicate to a reasonable man in
like position that such course is necessary to proper discharge of duty. People vs. Machel, 44 Cal. Rpts. 126.
II. The right of the officer to "frisk."
Having stopped such person, based on observation of
unusual behavior but without adequate grounds for arrest,
the officer has the right to "frisk" for weapons for the
protection of his own safety. Such conduct is a standard
set by the State of Ohio. It is not violative of the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
The petitioners argue that any "frisk" is a search in
the full meaning of the term. The "frisk" as it evolved in
the events that actually occurred in this case, and as it
is generally understood in police usage, is a contact or
patting of the outer clothing of a person to detect by the
sense of touch whether a concealed weapon is being carried. 29 The frisk is without question less such an invasion
People v. Rivera., 14 N. Y. 2d 441, 201 N. E. 2d 32, 252
N. Y. S. 2d 458 (1964), cert. den. 379 U. S. 978. See also Peopl.e
v. Koelze-r, 222 C. A. 2d 20, 34 Cal. Reptr. 718 (1963).
20
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of the person in degree than an initial full search of the
person would be. It ought to be distinguishable also on
pragmatic grounds from the degree of constitutional pr<>tection that would surround a full-blown search of the
person. This is exactly the distinction the trial judge made
in rendering his opinion, affirmed by the Court of Appeals
and review refused by the Ohio Supreme Court.
The test to be applied in determining whether the
frisk is reasonable, as a valid exercise of the police power
and in keeping with the Ker pronouncement (Ker vs.
Californ.ia, 374 U. S. 23 (1963)) that the states may develop workable rules to meet the practical demands of
effective criminal investigation and law enforcement, is
the same test used in determining the reasonableness of
a search and seizure: Whether the thing done in sum of
its form, scope, nature, incidents and effects impresses as·
being fundamentally unfair or unreasonable in the specific
situation when the immediate end sought is considered
against the private right affected. State vs. Hagan, 137
N. W. 2d 895 ; U. S. vs. Cook {D. C. E. D. Tenn. 1962),
213 Fed. Supp. 568; Schwimmer vs. U. S. (C. A. 8th Dist.
1956), 232 Fed. 2d 855, cert. den. 352 U.S. 833, 77 S. Ct.
48, 1 L. ed. 2d 52.
Persons found under suspicious circumstances are not
clothed with a right of privacy which prevents police
officers from inquiring as to their identity and actions.
The essential needs of public safety permit police officers
to use their faculties of observation and to act thereon
within proper limits (our emphasis) . State vs. H erdma.n,
130 N. W. 2d 628.
The right of the police to investigate gives rise to the
right to conduct a reasonable search for weapons in order
to protect safety of officers. People vs. Garrett, 47 Cal.
Rep. 731 (1966).
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If we recognize the authority of the police to stop an
individual and inquire concerning unusual street events
(U.S. vs. Vita, 294 Fed. 2d 524, 530; People vs. Marendi,
213 N. Y. 600, 609; in a similar direction U.S. vs. Bonanno,
180 F. Supp. 71, 81, 83, which, although reversed on other
grounds sub nom., U.S. vs. Buffalino, 285 F. 2d 410, was
cited on this point with approval in Vita at page 530),
we are required to recognize the hazards involved in this
kind of public duty. The answer to the question propounded by the policeman may be a bullet; in any case
the exposure to danger and the safety and welfare of the
officer (the public interest) could be very great. The
£risk for weapons is a reasonable and constitutionally
permissible precaution to minimize that danger in the
interest of safety and welfare. We ought not in deciding
what is reasonable close our eyes to the actualities of
street dangers encountered in performing this kind of
public duty. 30

This question can best be summed up by quoting that
pertinent part of the Ohio ·court of Appeals opinion regarding frisk:
"Having determined that the police officer could
validly inquire into the activities of the defendant,
then it follows that the officer ought to be allowed to
'frisk,' under some circumstances at least, to insure
that the suspect does not possess a dangerous weapon
which would put the safety of the officer in peril.
30

Police experience amply proves the need to search. For
exampie, Barbee v. Warden, 331 F. 2d 842 (1964), records the
misfortune of an officer who failed to make an adequate search.
When the officer took his prisoner to a callbox, the man drew a
gun, shot the officer, and fled.
Failure to make a proper search is said to be a circumstance in 19 percent of the cases in which police officers are
shot. Police Officer Shootings--A Tactical Evaluation, The J ournal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, March
1963.
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See, Remington, 'The Law Relating to "On the Street"
Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected
Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General,' 51
Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police
Science 386, 391 ( 1960). What is the officer to do in
this situation? Axe we to allow him the right of
inquiry and then, when this right is exercised, reward
him with an assailant's bullet? The practice of 'frisking' is well accepted in police practice, and police
officers seem unanimous in stating that 'frisking' is
done for self-protection and not as a mere evidentiary
'fishing expedition.' See: 'Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest,' 100 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1182 (1952); Leagre, 'The Fourth
Amendment and the Law of Arrest,' 54 Journal of
Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 393
(1963). The Uniform Arrest Act and the state statutes
which provide for questioning of suspicious persons
specifically allow for the 'frisking,' of a suspect. See,
Warner, 'The Uniform Arrest Act,' 28 Virginia Law
Review 315 (1942) ; General Laws of Rhode Island,
Section 12-7-2 (1956) ; New Hampshire Revised Statutes, Chapter 594, Sec. 3 (1955); 11 Delaware Code,
Sec. 1903 (1953); New York Code of Criminal Procedure (L. 1964), Chapter 86, Section 180-a. In other
states the right is recognized by court decision. See,
People vs. Rivera, 14 N. Y. (2d) 441 (1964); People
vs. Martin, 46 Cal. (2d) 106 (1956); People vs.
Simon, 45 Cal. (2d) 645 (1955); People vs. Jones,
176 Cal. App. (2d) 265 (1959) .
"In the instant case this offic..;:r of thirty-nine
years' experience reasonably suspected that the defendant was 'casing' a store with robbery in mind.
It was also logical for this experienced detective to
presume that the defendant was armed and dangerous. As stated in the record:
Q. Detective McFadden, can you tell us why
you turned John Terry around facing the other
two men, with you behind him?
407
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A. Due to my observation, the observation on
Huron Road of these two men, I felt as though they
were going to pull a stick-up and they may have a
gun.
"However, we must be careful to distinguish that
the 'frisk' authorized herein includes only a 'frisk' for
a dangerous weapon. It by no means authorizes a
search for contraband, evidentiary material, or anything else in the absence of reasonable grounds to arrest. Such a search is controlled by the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment and probable cause is essential. White vs. United States, 271 F. 2d 829
(C. C. A. D. C. 1959). Therefore, we hold only that
on the facts presented in the instant case, the 'frisk'
for dangerous weapons was valid as an incident to a
valid inquiry by the police. Each case must be
decided upon its own facts."

ill. "Stop and frisk" is differentiated from search and
seizure in that the quantum of facts required to
establish probable ca~se to "stop and frisk" is less
than the quantum of facts required to establish
probable cause to arrest and search.
While the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures makes no distinction between informal detention without cause and formal arrest without cause, there is a difference between "that
cause" which will justify informal detention short of arrest
and the probable cause standard required to justify that
kind of custody traditionally denominated an arrest. Wilson vs. Porter, 361 Fed. 2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1966).
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very
name applies, we deal with probabilities. These are not
technical; they are the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, act. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S.
408
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160, 93 L. ed. 1879, 69 S. Ct. 1002; State v. Mark, 46 N. J.
262, 271,. 216 A. 2d 377 (1966); State v. Dilley, 49 N. J.
460, 231 A. 2d 353 (1967).
While the rule permitting temporary detention for
questioning is operative under circumstances short of probable cause to make an arrest, there must exist some
susp1c1ous or unusual circumstances to authorize even
this limited invasion of citizens' privacy. People vs. Machel,
44 Cal. Rpts. 126.
The rule that circumstances short of probable cause
to make an arrest may still justify an officer stopping
pedestrians, motorists, or others on the street, for questioning does not conflict with the United States Constitution Fourth Amendment forbidding unreasonable searches
and seizures, but strikes a balance between a person's immunity from police interference and the community interest in law enforcement, and wards off pressure to
equate reasonable cause to investigate with reasonable
cause to arrest, thus protecting the innocent from the risk
of arrest when no more than reasonable investigation is
justified. People vs. Michelson, 59 Cal. Rep. 2d 448
(1963).
In addition to the pragmatic and factual distinction
that is made in the case at bar between "stop and frisk"
and a lawful arrest with subsequent search and seizure,
these acts are distinguishable from the standpoint of the
decisions of the courts in the various states on the quantum of probable cause that is necessary as to each. What
constitutes sufficient probable cause in a stop and frisk
s!_tuation is no more subject t.o a hard and fast rule than
is the probable cause for an arrest and subsequent search
and seizure. It is for the trial court to say in the first
instance, after hearing the facts, whether there is sufficient
probable cause. Each case must stand on its own merits.
409
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This is precisely what the trial court did in the instant
case. (State v. Chilton, 95 Ohio Law Abs. 321, 323, 324, 32
0 . 0. 2d 489.)
"At the same time a police officer cannot, as far
as this court is concerned-and will not be permitted
to-stop and frisk an individual simply because he
has a suspicion, a mere suspicion, unless there are
reasonable circumstances justifying a frisk. This
court believes there is a distinction between stopping
and frisking and search and seizure. A search is primarily for the purpose of trying to obtain evidence
in connection with the commission of a crime that
the police officer may reasonably believe has been
committed or might be committed. A frisk is strictly
for the protection of the officer's person and his life."
The court concluded there was
"reasonable cause for the officer * * * to approach
these individuals and pat them. He approached them
and for his own protection frisked them. He did not
go into their pockets * * *. But police officers in a
community also have rights under the constitution
and rights given to them by virtue of their office, and
one of those rights as I have indicated is the right
when the circumstances justify and there is a reason,.
able suspicion, and for his own personal protection, to
stop the individual or individuals and not search but
to frisk, to determine if there are weapons for his
own personal safety * * * without a warrant." (Our
emphasis.)
While the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures makes no distinction between informal detention without cause and formal arrest without cause, there is a difference between that
cause which will justify informal detention short of arrest and the probable cause required to justify that kind of
custody traditionally designated an arrest. Wilson vs.
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Porter, 361 Fed. 2d 412. This Court has held that the
mere fact that information may be hearsay does not destroy its role in establishing probable cause. Ker vs.
California, 374 U. S. 23; Brinegar vs. U. S., 338 U. S. 160.
In Draper vs. U.S., 358 U.S. 307 (1959) the Court held
that information from a reliable informer corroborated
by the agent's observation as to the accuracy of the informer's description of the accused and of his presence at
a particular place was sufficient to establish probable
cause for an arrest without a warrant.
Generally police officers may detain and question persons when circumstances are such as would indicate to
reasonable man in a like position that such course is necessary to proper discharge of duty. People vs. Machel, 44
Cal. Rpts. 126.
"Reasonable Cause" has been generally defined to be
such state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care
and prudence to believe and consciously entertain an
honest and strong suspicion that person is guilty of crime.
People v. Machel, supra.
Question of probable cause to justify defendant's arrest and search must be tested on facts which records
show were known to officers at time arrest was made.
People v. Machel, supra. Also People v. Hernandez, 40
Cal. Repts. 100.
While Mapp vs. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961) does not
deal with the question of "stop and frisk," the principles
enunciated therein and approved in Ker vs. California. are
sufficiently analogous to provide us with answers to the
present question:
"Mapp sounded no death knell for our federalism,
rather it echoed the sentiment of Elkins vs. U. S.,
supra, at 221, that a healthy federalism depends upon
the avoidance of needless conflict between state and
federal courts by itself urging that federal-state co-
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operation and the solution of crime under constitutional standard will be promoted, if only by recognition of their now mutual obligation to respect the same
fundamental criteria in their approach. 367 U. S. at
658." (the court's emphasis) 374 U. S. at 31.
"Second, Mapp did not attempt the impossible task
of laying down a final formula for the application in
specific cases of the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures; it recognized that
we would be met with recurring questions of the reasonableness of searches, and that, at any rate reasonableness is in the first instance for the trial court
* * * to determine, id. at 653, thus indicating that
the usual weight be given to findings of trial courts."
374 U. S. at 32.
Due regard for the practical necessities of effective
law enforcement requires that the validity of brief, informal detention be recognized whenever it appears from
totality of circumstances that the detaining officers could
have had reasonable grounds for their action, and a
founded suspicion is all that is necessary, that is, some
basis from which the court can determine that detention
was not arbitrary or harassing. Wilson v. Porter, 361 Fed.
2d 412, 415.
The trial court's finding of reasonable cause is wholly
consistent with the foregoing criteria. The court said:
"There was reasonable cause in this case for the officer Detective McFadden to approach these individuals and pat them. He approached them, and for
his own protection frisked them." (Our emphasis.)
In the light of that language the trial court was
doing exactly what this Court had expressed:
"federal-state cooperation in the solution of crime
under standards will be promoted, if only by recognition of their now mutual obligation to respect the
same fundamental criteria in their approach."
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Since the precise question had never been decided by
this Court, the trial court made every effort to follow and
respect fundamental criteria of due process in determining
the issue. The only innovation by the trial court was that
the quantum of evidence to establish probable cause for
stop and frisk need not be as great as that required for
arrest, search and seizure. The opinion of the trial court
abounds with fundamental criteria for deciding this question:
(1) "I am a great believer of the personal rights
propounded by our Supreme Court reiterated and reaffirmed, neglected over the years, and given to us
under the Fourth Amendment, and other amendments
of the United States Constitution."
(2) "At the same time a police officer cannotas far as this Court is concerned-and will not be
permitted to stop and frisk an individual simply because he has a suspicion, a mere suspicion, unless
there are reasonable circumstances justifying a frisk."
( 3) "When the circumstances justify and there
is reasonable suspicion, and for his own personal
protection * * * frisk to determine if there are
weapons for his personal safety."
( 4) "* * * officer * * * assigned in the area
which he had been placed, and doing the job he-had
been doing, had reasonable cause to believe and to
suspect that the defendants were conducting themselves suspiciously and some interrogation should be
made of their action."
(5) "There was reasonable cause in this case for
the officer to approach these individuals and pat
them."
Not only did the trial court recognize its obligations
and give respect to the fundamental criteria of due process
in deciding this question, but it is quite evident that the
Ohio Court of Appeals, as indicated by the following pas-
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sages, likewise recognized their obligation and gave respect to such fundamental criteria:
"Therefore, we hold in line with the great weight
of authority that a policeman may under appropriate
circumstances, such as exist in this case, reasonably
inquire of a person concerning his suspicious on-thestreet behavior in the absence of reasonable grounds
to arrest." (Our emphasis.)
"However, we must be careful to distinguish that
the "frisk" authorized herein includes only a "frisk"
for a dangerous weapon. It by no means authorizes
search for contraband, evidentiary material, or anything else in the absence of reasonable grounds to
arrest. Such a search is controlled by requirements
of the Fourth Amendment and probable cause is essential. White vs. United States (C. C. A. D. C.
1959) , 271 F. 2d 829. Therefore, we hold only that
on the facts presented in the instant case, the "frisk"
for dangerous weapons was valid as an incident to a
valid inquiry by the police. Each case must be decided
upon its own facts."
As to whether there was sufficient evidence which
gave the officer reasonable grounds to stop, question, and
frisk petitioners, respondent relies on the state of the
record:
(1) Police officer on duty performing his police
responsibilities.
(2) Thirty-nine years' experience.
(3) Observation of suspicious activities of petitioners and other.
( 4) Concludes a stick-up is imminent.
(5) Decides to investigate and interrogate.
(6) Identifies himself as a law officer.
(7) Asked their names-receives incoherent
answers.
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(8) Frisked for weapon for his protection.
(9) Nature of the suspected crime-stick-up:
inference of the use of a weapon and violence.

(10) The absence of assistance to the officer in
relation to the number of suspects (three) .
(11) The sex of the subjects- all male.
(12) The demeanor and seeming agility of the
suspects and the clothing they wore, as inference of
possibility of concealed weapons.

We recognize that the trial court's findings of reasonableness, as affirmed by the Ohio Court of Appeals, are respected only insofar as consistent with federal constitutional guarantees and that they are by no means insulated
against examination by this Court. Spano vs. N. Y ., 360
U. S. 315, 316 (1959); Thomas vs. Arizona, 356 U. S. 390393 (1958) ; Pierre vs. Louisiana., 306 U. S. 354, 358
(1939) ; Ker vs. California, 374 U. S. 23.
We welcome the Court's. examination of the facts, in
making its determinations and findings, to restablish that as
to reasonableness, the fundamental, i.e. constitutional,
criteria laid down by this Court have been respected in
every instance in the case at bar.
IV. In the case at bar the lawful "frisk" produced additional evidentiary facts giving rise to probable cause
to arrest for committing a felony in the presence of
the officer.
Probable cause for the arrest of petitioners, while not
present at the time the officer approached these men to
question them, nevertheless was present at the time of
their arrest. There appears to be no question but that the
trial judge, defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney
are in agreement that up to the point the "frisk" produced
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knowledge of the weapon probable cause for arrest did not
exist.
The lawfulness of the arrest without a warrant, in
turn, must be based upon probable cause, that is, where
the facts and circumstances within his (the officer's)
knowledge and of which he had reasonable trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been
or is being committed. Brinegar vs. U. S., 338 U. S. 160,
quoting from Carroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S. 132, 162 (1925);
accord People vs. Fisher, 49 Cal. 2d 442, 317 P. 2d 967
(1957); Bompensiero vs. Superior Ct., 44 Cal. 2nd 178,
281 P. 2nd 250 (1955); Ker vs. California, 374 U. S. 23.
The information within the knowledge of the officer
at the time he approached the petitioners clearly furnished
grounds for his investigation and interrogation. Upon
identifying himself as a police officer and receiving
mumbled, incoherent responses, such suspicious evasion
added further probable c;rnse to the officer's previous conclusion that a stick-up was imminent. In view of the
totality of the circumstances existing at that moment it
was not unreasonable for the officer to come to that conclusion. Thereupon the officer took hold of one man and
patted him to determine if he had any weapons before
asking further questions:
"Q. Det. McFadden, can you tell us why you
turned John Terry around facing the other two men
with you behind him?
A. Due to my observations, the observations on
Huron Road of these two men, I felt as though they
were going to pull a stick-up and they may have a
gun.

(R. 137) I wanted to se~ if they had any guns."
Had the officer frisked and found nothing there would
have been no grounds for an arrest. The officer, while
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frisking, through his sense of touch felt a bulge in Terry's
left breast pocket, which he decided was a gun. We must
at this point recall that here is an officer with 39 years'
experience and training who has had countless opportunities to recognize the presence of weapons conc~aled under a
suspect's clothing. Applying this accumulated experience
to his observations of these men, the only intelligent conclusion that the experienced police officer could make
was that the petitioners were at that time committing a
felony in the officer's presence by carrying a concealed
weapon. To this point there has been no arrest, no search.
The arrest followed immediately when the men were
ordered to move inside the store and place their hands
against the wall. Where before there was no intent to detain, there is now; where before there was no probable
cause to arrest, there is now.
The petitioners were not free to go at liberty. They
were under arrest. Even though technical words "You
are under arrest" were not spoken, a valid arrest had
been made.
Circumstances short of probable cause to make an
arrest may still justify officers stopping pedestrians or
motorists on streets for questioning, and as circumstances
warrant, officer may, in self protection, superficially
search suspect for concealed weapons and should investigation then reveal probable cause to make an arrest,
officer may arrest suspect and conduct reasonable search
incidental thereto. People vs. Machel, 44 Cal. Rpts. 126.
To justify the seizure of a weapon which could be
used against the arresting officer we shall not draw a fine
line measuring the possible ~ks to the officer's safety.
The officer should be permitted to take every reasonable precaution to safeguard his life in the process of
making the arrest. State vs. Reilly, 402 P. 2d 741 (1965).
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In State vs. Herdman, 130 N. W. 2d 628, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota uses the following language:
"In the argument before this court it appears to
be the claim of the defendant that the evidence used
against him was the product of an exploratory search
without probable cause in violation of his rights under the 4th and 14th Amendments. It seems to be
further urged that since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. ed. 2d 1081, police officers are not
permitted to accost a suspicious character on a public
street for questioning. While the Mapp case and
numerous decisions recently handed down by the
United States Supreme Court clearly establish that
under state Cl~:d federal procedure citizens are entitled to uniform protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures, we do not understand that
these decisions have gone so far as to require or suggest that state police officers follow precise procedures
in making arrests, searches and seizures. The Fourth
Amendment protects the individual only from 'unreasonable' searche~ and seizures; and whether a
search and seizure is 'unreasonable' must depend
upon the particular facts of each case.
"Nor do we feel that the legality of the arrest of
defendant is tainted because the police officers accosted and interviewed defendant without actual information that he was carrying stolen property in his
automobile. Under the circumstances here, the police
officers did no more than what they were required to
do in performance of their duties. * * *"
However convincing cases from other jurisdictions
may be, this Court in cases under the Fourth Amendment
has long recognized that the lawfulness of arrest by state
officers for federal offenses is to be determined by references to state law insofar as it is not violative of the federal constitution. Miller v. U. S., 357 U. S. 301 (1958);
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U. S. v. DiRe, 332 U. S. 581 (1948); Johnson v. U. S.,
333 U. S. 10, 15, Note 5 (1948).
A fortiori, the lawfulness of these arrests by the
officer for state offenses is to be determined by Ohio law.

Ohio Revised Code Section 2935.04 provides:
"2935.04. When Any Person May Arrest.
"When a felony has been committed, or there is
reasonable ground to believe that a felony has been
committed, any person without a warrant may arrest
another whom he has reasonable cause to believe is
guilty of the offense, and detain him until a warrant
can be obtained."
Ohio Revised Code Section 2923.01 provides in pertinent part:
"2923.01. Carrying of Concealed Weapon.
"No person shall carry a pistol, bowie knife, dirk,
or other dangerous weapon concealed on or about his
person. This section does not affect the right of sheriffs, regularly appointed _police officers of municipal
corporations, regularly elected constables, and special
officers as provided by Sections 311.07, 737.10,
1717.06, 1721.14, and 2917.32 of the Revised Code, to
go armed when on duty. * * *"
To sum up this question we again refer to our Court
of Appeals Opinion:
"As a result of the valid 'frisk,' a fully loaded automatic was discovered concealed on the person of the
defendant. The unauthorized possession of this weap~
on is a felony under Section 2923.01, Revised Code.
According to the uncontradicted evidence in this case,
the defendant was not arrested until after he was
ordered into the store. At the moment of the arrest,
the detective had reasonable grounds to believe a
felony was being committed. As stated in Beck vs.
Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 (1964):
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'Whether an arrest is constitutionally valid depends
upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made,
the officers had probable cause to make itwhether at that moment, the facts and circumstances within their knowledge of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient
to warrant a prudent man in believing the petitioners had committed or were committing an offense.'
"Therefore, we hold that, as the detective had
validly found the gun, he had at the moment of the
arrest adequate probable cause to arrest the defendant, Busby vs. United States (C. C. A. 9, 1961), 296
F. 2d 328, and that the arrest in no way violated the
Fourth Amendment.
"One further point remains to be discussed concerning defendant's contention that the arrest occurred at the time of the initial questioning and therefore under the exclusionary rule of Mapp vs. Ohio,
367 U. S. 643 (1961), the evidence must be suppressed. Although we have held that the arrest in
this case did not take place until the defendant was
ordered into the store, we must note in passing that
even if the arrest took place as defendant contends, it
does not necessarily follow that this evidence must
be suppressed. 31
"The Mapp exclusionary rule was imposed upon
the states not because of some command inherent in
the Fourth Amendment, but rather because the Supreme Court believed that it was the only way the
police could be forced to respect the Fourth Amendment. If the police could not obtain a conviction
using evidence unlawfully obtained, they would have
no incentive to conduct illegal searches. If we keep in
31 Some searches made a few moments before the arrest to
which they were incidental have been upheld and the evidence
seized admissible. U. S. v. Devenere, 332 F. 2d 160 (1964); U. S.
v. Boston, 330 F. 2d 937 (1964); Dickey v. U. S ., 332 F. 2d 773
(1964) .
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mind this raison d'etre of the exclusionary rule, we
can guard against confusion in the attendant rules
that are developed. A judicial rule rendering evidence produced as the result of a 'frisk' inadmissible
would fail to deter the police from 'frisking' suspects
believe to be armed as police 'frisk' for their own
protection rather than for the purpose of looking for
evidence. A rule of inadmissibility in such cases
could only result in allowing the armed criminal to go
free although failing to any meaningful extent to protect individual liberty. The exclusionary rule of
illegally obtained evidence cannot be interpreted
solely to provide a tidy 'fox hunting' theory of criminal justice. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is
to control police misconduct and in this context it
must be applied. Traynor, 'Mapp vs. Ohio at Large
In the Fifty States,' 1962 Duke Law Journal 319
(1962); Note, 50 Cornell Law Quarterly 529 (1965).
"Furthermore, even if the Supreme Court would
hold that federal officers may not inquire into suspicious street activities or 'frisk' in the absence of
probable cause to airest, this does not necessarily
invalidate the applicable state rules. There is no
mandate in the Mapp opinion that the states henceforth must abide by all the interpretations of the
federal courts. Traynor, 'Mapp vs. Ohio at Large In
the Fifty States,' Duke Law Journal (1962) 319 at
320. Local problems of law enforcement are quite
different from federal problems, and the range of
crimes encompassed by the states' jurisdiction creates
more complicated patterns to be dealt with. The states
are not precluded from developing 'workable rules'
governing arrest, searches and seizures to meet the
practical demands of effective criminal investigation
and law enforcement provided those rules do not violate the constitutional proscriptions against unreasonable searches and the concomitant command that
evidence so seized is inadmissible against one who has
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standing to complain. Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23
(1963); Beck vs. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 (1964). The
necessities of law enforcement in large urban areas
require the procedures utilized in the instant case.
We agree with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals when they stated that they cannot believe that
the 'Supreme Court has forbidden the police to investigate crime.' Trilling vs. United States, 260 F.
(2d) 677, 700 (D. C. Cir. 1958) ."
It is incorrectly argued by the petitioners that the
trial court made a finding that the arrest was unlawful
and that after making such a finding of illegal arrest the
court should have suppressed the evidence. The fact is
that the trial court never held that these men were
illegally arrested in this case. The court merely said that
had the arrests preceded the frisking of the men, such
arrests would then have been illegal. The court then delineated the distinction between "frisking" as commonly
practiced by police officers when they stop a suspect and
the search of the person incident to arrest.
If we accept the law of "stop and frisk" as a benefit
to society in the interest of safety and welfare, the subsequent factual situation must be looked into in the light
of that law to establish whether we have a legal arrest and
a search incident thereto. The facts as heretofore discussed in no way abridge the constitutional rights of the
petitioners.
The petitioners contend, however, at certain points
of their argument that despite a right of inquiry, the arrest
took place the moment the defendant was questioned by
the detective. They argue that at that time there were no
adequate "reasonable grounds" to arrest and therefore
under the exclusionary rule of Ma.pp vs. Ohio, 367 U. S.
643 (1961), the evidence must be suppressed. In support
of this the petitioner's brief states:

j .,

l '
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"Since the police officer in this case did not conduct
any interrogation of the defendant and his companions other than an inquiry of their names * * *
his purpose was to arrest and not to interrogate."
A principal cause of the difficulty here is the ambiguous nature of the word "arrest" to signify the mere
act of stopping or restraining a person. But the term
"arrest" is more commonly used in the technical criminal
law sense as the seizure of an alleged offender to answer
for a crime. Note, 39 New York University Law Review
1093, 1096 (1964); Commonwealth vs. Lehan, 347 Mass.
197 (1964). The cases decided by the United States Supreme Court appear to have adopted this later usage, see
Carroll vs. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 136 (1925);
Brinegar vs. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 163 (1949), and
it is the usage that has been adopted by the courts of Ohio.
In 5 Ohio Jurisprudence (2d), Arrest, Sec. 3, p . 19, "arrest" is defined as follows:

"An arrest as the term is used in criminal law
signifies the apprehension or detention of the person
of another in order that he may be forthcoming to
answer an alleged or supposed crime."
Similarly, in State vs. Milam, 108 Ohio App. 254, 268
(1959), the court quoted with approval the following
definition of arrest:
"To constitute an 'arrest', four requisites are involved: A purpose to take the person into custody of
the law, under real or pretended authority and an
actual or constructive seizure or detention of his person, so understood by the person arrested."
It is readily apparent that a required element of an
arrest is the intent of the officer to arrest. United States
vs. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 at 81-83. In the instant
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case, when the detective approached the defendant, he
had, as shown by uncontradicted testimony, no intention
at all to arrest, but only to inquire as to the defendant's
activities. As stated in the record:
"Q. You observed these men for some ten to
twelve minutes?
A. That's right.
Q. You observed the mode of conduct that you
have described to us?
A. That's right.
Q. Did you, sir, as a police officer consider that
you should investigate it?
A. I did.

* **

Q. * * * after they left the corner and you observed them again in front of * * * (the store where
the three men met) * * * what did you do?
A. I stopped them and went over and talked to
them."

As to the exact time when the arrest took place, the record
shows:
"Q. Then in this situation you considered them
to be under arrest when you ordered the store people
to call for the wagon?
A. That's right."

It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that the case of
Henry vs. United States, 361 U. S. 98 (1959) establishes
the point that the arrest in the instant case took place the
moment the defendant was stopped by the detective.
However, in the Henry case, the government conceded in
the lower courts, see 259 F. (2d) 725 (7th Cir. 1958), and
adhered to the concession before the Supreme Court, that
the "arrest" occurred the moment the car in which Henry
was riding was stopped by the federal agents. The Court
stated:
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"The prosecution conceded below, and adheres to that
conces~ion here, that the arrest took place when the
federal agents stopped the car. This is our view of
the facts of this particular case." 361 U. S. at 103.
When the opinion in Henry is read in light of this
concession, it is apparent that the Court was only deciding
that, in the circumstances of that case, there was no probable cause to justify an "arrest" at the time the car in
which Henry was riding was stopped. See, United States
vs. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 at p. 85; Busby vs. United
States, 296 F. 2d 328.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals held in the instant
case, that the actual arrest did not occur until the defendant was ordered into the store after the loaded gun was
discov~ed concealed on his person; Cf. Rios vs. United
Sta.tes, 364 U. S. 253 (1960).
Section 2935.01 of the Ohio Revised Code defines
arrest:
"To deprive a person of his liberty by legal authority.
The seizing of a person and detaining him in the
custody of the law."
V. In the instant case there was a lawful arrest without
a warrant for the commission of a felony and a legal
search incident to the arrest; therefore evidence obtained in such search was admissible at the trial.
Since there was a lawful arrest, the sole point remaining concerns the lawfulness of the search and admissibility of the evidence seized. The evidence at issue,
in order to be admissible, must be the product of a search
incident to a lawful arrest, since the officer had no search
warrant. The search most commonly made by law enforcement officers, and the subject of the petitioner's complaint
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herein, is that of the person of the accused whom the
officer had arrested. Searches of the person must conform
to federal constitutional standards. The Fourth Amendment provides in part "* * * that the right of the people
to be secure in their person, house, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated * * *."
The vast majority of searches of the person are made
incidental to lawful arrest. English and American law
has always recognized the right on the part of the government to search the person of the accused when legally
arrested. Weeks vs. U. S., 232 U. S. 383, 392 (1914);
Abel vs. U. S., 362 U. S. 217 (1960).
The law on this subject has long been so well settled
that it is useless to do more than state it whenever the
occasion arises. Lefkowitz vs. U. S . Atty., 52 Fed. 2d 52
(1931), affirmed 285 U. S. 452.
The right to search applies to arrests for misdemeanors as well as to thos~ for felonies, U. S . vs. Schned,
278 Fed. 650 (1922); Davis vs. U.S., 328 U.S. 582 (1946),
assuming an arrest in the full sense of the term.
The legal basis of the right to search is given by law
to the arresting officer for three reasons:
(1) To protect the officer against harm;
(2) to deprive the prisoner of potential means
of escape; and
( 3) to prevent destruction of evidence by the
arrested person.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in U.S . v . Rabinowitz,
339 U. S. 56 (1950); Abel v. U. S., 362 U . S. 217 at 236.
If the arrest of the person is unlawful, any subsequent
search made incidental to arrest is unreasonable. U. S. v.
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DiRe, 332 U. S. 581 (1948); Brandon v. U. S., 270 F. 2d
311 (1959), Note 5, cert. den. 362 U. S. 943; Bynus v.
U. S., 262 U. S. 465; Williams v . U. S., 237 F. 2d 789
(1956).
No matter how valid the arrest may be in a technical
sense, if the court finds that it was used by the officers
simply as a pretext to make a search of the person, the
search is unreasonable. Taglavore v. U. S., 291 F. 2d 262
(1961) . "An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search
for evidence." U. S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 (1932).
The search of the person, incidental to arrest, should
be made by one or more of the arresting officers. U. S. v.
Grieco, 25 F. R. D. 58 (1960).
The officer's right to make a search of the person
incidental to arrest being predicated upon the arrest, the
search must follow the arrest, not precede it. White v.
U. S., 271 F. 2d 829 (1959); U. S. v. Hamn, 163 F. Supp.
4 (1958) .
At this point the distinction made by the trial court
and the appellate court comes into focus. The foregoing
rule in the White and Hamn cases and the decision in the
Mapp case will not outlaw a state officer's frisking or
even a search of the person made prior to arrest. Under
the Uniform Arrest Act, adopted with modifications in
Delaware, New Hampshire and Rhode Island, "a peace
officer may search for a dangerous weapon any person
whom he has stopped or detained to question as provided
in Section 2, whenever he has reasonable ground to believe that he is in danger if the person possesses a dangerous weapon. If the officer finds a weapon, he may take
and keep it until the completion of the questioning, when
he shall either return it or arrest the person." "The Uniform Arrest Act," 28 Virginia Law Review 315 at 344
(1942).
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The law in the case at bar as pronounced in the opinion of the Ohio Court of Appeals is so well founded that,
in a case involving almost identical facts, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey has quoted and cited with approval
that opinion. State v. Dilley, 49 N. J. 460, 231 A. 2d 353.
(September 1967.)
The proposition that evidence seized as a result of a
lawful arrest followed by a legal search of the person is
so axiomatic that it requires no further argument here.
CONCLUSION.
It was stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in "The Common
Law and Collected Legal Papers":
"The life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, institutions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men,
have had a good de~ to do with the syllogism in
determining the rules by which men should be governed."
Recognition must be given to the fact that in our
changing society conditions and circumstances vary; that
logic, experience, necessity, prevailing moral and political
theories, public policy and prejudices all reflect and determine the rules under which we as men live. But these
are not the only elements to which recognition must be
given in formulating such rules.
The realities of our currently changing society require
the addition of another ingredient-perhaps the most
essential one-the deadly realism of crime. We should
therefore take note of the experiences of those who have
been confronted with this deadly reality to the end that
our steps will be toward that road on which the guideposts
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will be directed to insuring the safety and welfare of the
personnel to whom our own safety and welfare are
entrusted.
While this brief is in preparation, October 12, 1967,
we are confronted with a classic example of the deadly
realism of crime. Through the news media we are informed that an automobile containing four men was involved in several holdups. The state highway patrol received a description of the automobile. The officers pursued a car matching the description and brought it to a
halt. A patrohnan dismounted from his car to investigate
and interrogate the occupants. As he approached their
automobile he was met with a bullet. Except for the fact
that an item of his equipment (a belt) deflected the bullet,
this officer would have been killed. Such experience involving public safety should be far more convincing as to
the deadly realism of crime than any logic respondent
could present. Experience and necessity, as illustrated
by this incident, demonstrate that the right to stop and
frisk is essential for the welfare of the officer and the protection of the public. Experience and necessity should of
themselves dictate affirmance of the judgment in this case.
Thus we urge that due recognition of safety, experience, necessity and considerations of public policy and
the deadly realism of crime merit affi.rmance of this decision to the end that the maximum safety and security be
afforded to those to whom are entrusted the protection of
the well-being of society. To those who have beat the
drums of fear that the framework of the constitutional
safeguards will collapse and we will move several steps
forward to a police state if this case is affirmed, we reply
in the words of Judge Lewis of the United States Court of
Appeals, Tenth Circuit, in Anspach v. U. S., 305 F. 2d 48
(1962):
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"But the prevention and detection of crime ·is not a
polite business and we see no need or justification for
reading into the fourth amendment a standard of conduct for law enforcement officials which would leave
society at the mercy of those dedicated to the destruction of the very freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. The 'pursuit of happiness' referred to by Justice
Brandeis in Olmstead can be destroyed by idealistic
theory that shuns the deadly realism of crime."
Even though this case merits affirmance on the basis
of any one of the elements that determine the law--changing conditions and circumstances, necessity, moral and
political theories, public policy, prejudice, the deadly
realism of crime--in the end the decision rests on the sum
total of these elements. The affirmance of the law in this
case is logically and fundamentally fair when equated with
the deadly realism of crime. In the face of this deadly
reality, affirmance on the basis of the sum total of these
elements results in a benefit to society and is not arbitrary
or capricious.
"The judicial approach to the problem, of course,
must be in a spirit of cooperation with the police
officials in the administration of justice. They are
directly charged with the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and are under the same
obligation as the judicial arm to discharge their duties
in a manner consistent with the Constitution and
statutes. The prevention and punishment of crime
is a difficult and dangerous task, for the most part
performed by security and prosecuting personnel in
a spirit of public service to the community. Only by
the maintenance of law and order may the rights of
the criminal and the law-abiding elements of the
population be protected." Mr. Justice Reed dissenting in Upshaw v. U. S., 335 U. S. 410 (1948).

430

43

Thus we conclude our case by urging that if the rules
that we as men live under are to stand and to meet the
test of the deadly realism of crime, the decision of the Ohio
Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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